The Paradox of Authoritarian Power: Bureaucratic Games and Information Asymmetry. The Case of Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan
Tutumlu A. Rustemov I.
2021Routledge
Problems of Post-Communism
2021#68Issue 2124 - 134 pp.
This article questions conventional interpretations of the nature of power in authoritarian regimes that treat the political position of the ruler as hierarchical and top-down. Instead, it applies the principal–agent problem to information asymmetry in a single case study, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan, to analyze the inability of the ruler to conduct effective oversight when officials engage in elaborate personality cults, depoliticization, and informal patronal practices that threaten the market and the legitimacy of the ruler. Data for this article came from local mass media and in-depth interviews with mid-level bureaucrats in Kazakhstan collected in 2011–2017 on a confidential basis.
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Department of International Relations, Near East University, TRNC, Nicosia, Cyprus
Department of Transport Construction and Production of Building Materials, Kazakh Institute of Automobile and Road Construction named after L. B. Goncharov (KazADI), Almaty, Kazakhstan
Department of International Relations
Department of Transport Construction and Production of Building Materials
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