Set-aside auctions and small businesses’ participation in public procurement: an empirical analysis

Shagbazian G. Valbonesi P. Tkachenko A. Shadrina E.
2026 Routledge

Applied Economics
2026 #58 Issue 5 889 - 903 pp.

We investigate the effects of set-aside (SA) auctions supporting small business participation in public procurement, exploiting an original database of e-auctions for Russian granulated sugar (a largely homogeneous good) in the period 2011–2013. This affirmative action programme–as in many others similar and commonly adopted programmes by governments–records confounding effects. On the one hand, SA auctions attract more small business enterprises; on the other hand, SA auctions restrict the entry of possibly more cost-efficient large firms. Our findings highlight that SA auctions, on average, determine lower final prices for the procurer than non-SA (NSA) auctions do, although competition in SA auctions is not higher. We show that these findings depend on the reserve price intervals, supporting the effectiveness of SA auctions for small-scale procurement.

auctions , economics of regulation , Procurement , SME policy

Text of the article Перейти на текст статьи

University of Padua, Department of Economics and Management, Padua, Italy
Department of Economics, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
HSE University, Russian Federation

University of Padua
Department of Economics
HSE University

10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель

Книга Публикация научной статьи Волощук 2026 Book Publication of a scientific article 2026