WISDOM, NOT VERITISM
МУДРОСТЬ, А НЕ ВЕРИТИЗМ
Ryan S.
2021Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
2021#58Issue 460 - 67 pp.
In this response to Pritchards “In Defence of Veritism”, I defend the view that it is wisdom rather than truth that is fundamental in epistemology. Given that recent philosophical discussions of the nature of wisdom may be unfamiliar to some epistemologists, a brief overview of these discussions is provided and that which is relevant for the subsequent discussion in this piece is highlighted. I explain that scholars working on the topic tend to accept that wisdom comprises at least one familiar epistemic standing and that, unlike other epistemic goods, wisdom is thought to be tied to a narrowly specified content. I clarify the philosophical question to which veritism is the proposed answer and clarify the different senses of fundamental in play in that question. As Pritchard points out, fundamentality in epistemology concern both conceptual and axiological claims. Next, I explicate Pritchards veritism, his defence of the claim that truth is fundamental in epistemology, explaining the case made for its superiority over the considered alternatives. One alternative I consider is that there is no fundamental good in epistemology, either conceptually or axiologically. I examine whether Pritchard can reject truth equality successfully while maintaining his monism with regard to what he takes to be epistemically fundamental. Indeed, while Pritchards appeal to the intellectually virtuous inquirer here seems appropriate, his view that this ultimately provides support to his truth monism is less convincing for reasons that will be explored. I follow up this discussion by arguing that an appeal to the intellectually virtuous agent better lends support to wisdom as epistemically fundamental, rather than Pritchards veritism. I make the point that Pritchards claim that the intellectually virtuous agent loves the truth is plausible but I question whether its also plausible that the love of the intellectually virtuous agent stops at the truth. Rather, I claim that such an agent ultimately loves wisdom. In fact, wisdom seems likely to be the highest good prized by the intellectually virtuous agent - the good that they strive to attain or become better with regard to across a lifetime. In support of this claim, I point out that wisdom is the most prized of all epistemic goods.
Epistemology , Intellectual virtue , Pritchard , Veritism , Wisdom
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