NEGOTIATION on NATURAL RESOURCES
Pelzman J. Issabayev M. Oskenbayev Y.
March 2021World Scientific
Global Economy Journal
2021#21Issue 1
The host government (HG) of resource-rich countries (RRC) dealing with multiple International Oil Companies (IOCs) faces a choice between making a simultaneous multilateral offer and a sequential bilateral offer on equity shares from resource value. Provided that the HG treats all its foreign partners in a simultaneous negotiation as a single entity, it is argued that the HG is predicted to gain a higher equity share from a simultaneous multilateral bargaining deal than from a sequential bilateral one with each player. Furthermore, we argue that in case of positive weak externality from a sequential bilateral game, HG would still prefer a simultaneous multilateral game due to superadditivity and efficiency properties of grand coalition.
coalition , externality , Resource-rich countries , sequential bilateral bargaining , simultaneous multilateral bargaining
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Department of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States
School of Postgraduate Studies, Narxoz University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Kazakh-British Technical University, Business School, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Department of Economics
School of Postgraduate Studies
Kazakh-British Technical University
10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель
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