Constitutional limits on legislative delegation: lessons from the COVID-19 emergency powers
Makhambetsaliyev D.B.
1 December 2025Oxford University Press
Statute Law Review
2025#46Issue 3
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic triggered a profound constitutional stress test for liberal democracies, exposing the fragility of traditional doctrines governing legislative delegation. Drawing on doctrinal and judicial responses in Germany, the USA, and the UK, this article interrogates how existing constitutional limits failed to constrain the expansion of executive power under emergency conditions. Through comparative analysis of landmark decisions—including Germany’s Bundesnotbremse, the US Supreme Court’s ‘major questions’ doctrine, and UK judicial review of lockdown powers—this study argues for a reconceptualization of delegation doctrines. The article proposes a theory of ‘emergency constitutionalism’ that integrates temporal exigency, scientific expertise, and proportionality within a framework of democratic accountability.
constitutional limits , COVID-19 , emergency powers , legislative delegation , non-delegation doctrine , separation of powers
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Department of Theory and History of State and Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Faculty of Law, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Department of Theory and History of State and Law
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