On the connection between lying, asserting, and intending to cause beliefs
Krstić V.
2025Routledge
Inquiry (United Kingdom)
2025#68Issue 2643 - 662 pp.
According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting.
Asserting , belief , intending to deceive , lying
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School of Sciences and Humanities, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
School of Sciences and Humanities
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