Deciding Under a Description
Heeney M.
June 2024John Wiley and Sons Inc
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
2024#105Issue 2191 - 209 pp.
I issue a challenge for the view that deciding-to-A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro-attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro-attitude.
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Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies, Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan
Department of History
10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель
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