A Shared Capacity Account of Rousseau’s General Will
Hatch C.A.
2024University of Michigan Press
Philosophers Imprint
2024#24
Interpretations of Rousseau’s general will have tended to privilege one of two aspects of the general will over the other. Procedural accounts identify the general will with the result of a majority vote of all the citizens. Common good accounts identify the general will with the common good (often as publicly understood by the citizens). In this paper, I argue that identifying the general will with either of these aspects makes the Rousseau’s insistence on other aspect mysterious. I propose a shared capacity account which unites both aspects. Like an individual’s will, the general will is a capacity for self-determination in accordance with a conception of the good. To be a will, it must have both a procedure for self-determination and a constitutive end. To be general, both procedure and end must be shared by all the citizens. I defend my interpretation on the grounds that it accords with Rousseau’s insistence on both procedure and end and that it yields a compelling account of the freedom that Rousseau thinks we enjoy under the general will.
common good , freedom , general will , majority , political philosophy , Rousseau , will
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Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan
Nazarbayev University
10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель
Книга Публикация научной статьи Волощук 2026 Book Publication of a scientific article 2026