We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance
Carrara M. Chiffi D. De Florio C. Pietarinen A.-V.
April 2021Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Synthese
2021#198Issue 43565 - 3580 pp.
The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.
Assertion , Ignorance , Pragmatic logic , Uncertainty
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University of Padova, Padua, Italy
DAStU, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy
Catholic University, Milan, Italy
Nazarbayev University, Nursultan, Kazakhstan
Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation
University of Padova
DAStU
Catholic University
Nazarbayev University
Research University Higher School of Economics
10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель
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