Incentives and Strategic Behavior of Professional Boxers
Akin Z. Issabayev M. Rizvanoghlu I.
January 2023SAGE Publications Ltd
Journal of Sports Economics
2023#24Issue 128 - 49 pp.
In professional boxing, a higher-ranked boxer chooses his opponent among challengers varying in popularity and strength. We build a three-stage model of a professional boxing fight between the chooser and a challenger to examine the strategic incentives of a chooser in sharing the purse and exerting a proper level of effort. More importantly, we endogenize the choice of the opponent and the purse to be generated. We found that an older chooser who is ready to cash in his reputation tends to choose a stronger opponent with little effort, while a young rising “star” prefers a match against weaker opponents.
bargaining , boxing , C72 , contests , game theory , incentives , opponent choice , Z2
Text of the article Перейти на текст статьи
Department of Decision Sciences and Economics, American University in Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Department of Doctoral Studies, Narxoz University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
University of Houston, Department of Economics, Houston, TX, United States
Department of Decision Sciences and Economics
Department of Doctoral Studies
University of Houston
10 лет помогаем публиковать статьи Международный издатель
Книга Публикация научной статьи Волощук 2026 Book Publication of a scientific article 2026